| sixth ditto | 3 | 0 per pound |
| On the seventh ditto | 4 | 0 per pound |
| On the eighth ditto | 5 | 0 per pound |
| On the ninth ditto | 6 | 0 per pound |
| On the tenth ditto | 7 | 0 per pound |
| On the eleventh ditto | 8 | 0 per pound |
| On the twelfth ditto | 9 | 0 per pound |
| On the thirteenth ditto | 10 | 0 per pound |
| On the fourteenth ditto | 11 | 0 per pound |
| On the fifteenth ditto | 12 | 0 per pound |
| On the sixteenth ditto | 13 | 0 per pound |
| On the seventeenth ditto | 14 | 0 per pound |
| On the eighteenth ditto | 15 | 0 per pound |
| On the nineteenth ditto | 16 | 0 per pound |
| On the twentieth ditto | 17 | 0 per pound |
| On the twenty-first ditto | 18 | 0 per pound |
| On the twenty-second ditto | 19 | 0 per pound |
| On the twenty-third ditto | 20 | 0 per pound |
The foregoing table shows the progression per pound on every progressive thousand. The following table shows the amount of the tax on every thousand separately, and in the last column, the total amount of all the separate sums collected.
Table II
| d. | l. | s. | d. | |
| An estate of £50 per ann. at | 3 per pd. pays | 0 | 12 | 6 |
| 100 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| 200 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 0 |
| 300 | 3 | 3 | 15 | 0 |
| 400 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| 500 | 3 | 7 | 5 | 0 |
After 500l.—the tax of sixpence per pound takes place on the second 500l.—consequently an estate of 1,000l. per ann. pays 21l. 15s. and so on.
| Total amount | ||||||
| l. | s. | d. | l. | s. | l. | s. |
| For the 1st 500 at | 0 | 3 per pound | 7 | 5 | 21 | 15 |
| 2d 500 at | 0 | 6 | 14 | 10 | ||
| 2d 1000 at | 0 | 9 | 37 | 10 | 59 | 5 |
| 3rd 1000 at | 1 | 0 | 50 | 0 | 109 | 5 |
| 4th 1000 at | 1 | 6 | 75 | 0 | 184 | 5 |
| 5th 1000 at | 2 | 0 | 100 | 0 | 284 | 5 |
| 6th 1000 at | 3 | 0 | 150 | 0 | 434 | 5 |
| 7th 1000 at | 4 | 0 | 200 | 0 | 634 | 5 |
| 8th 1000 at | 5 | 0 | 250 | 0 | 880 | 5 |
| 9th 1000 at | 6 | 0 | 300 | 0 | 1180 | 5 |
| 10th 1000 at | 7 | 0 | 350 | 0 | 1530 | 5 |
| 11th 1000 at | 8 | 0 | 400 | 0 | 1930 | 5 |
| 12th 1000 at | 9 | 0 | 450 | 0 | 2380 | 5 |
| 13th 1000 at | 10 | 0 | 500 | 0 | 2880 | 5 |
| 14th 1000 at | 11 | 0 | 550 | 0 | 3430 | 5 |
| 15th 1000 at | 12 | 0 | 600 | 0 | 4030 | 5 |
| 16th 1000 at | 13 | 0 | 650 | 0 | 4680 | 5 |
| 17th 1000 at | 14 | 0 | 700 | 0 | 5380 | 5 |
| 18th 1000 at | 15 | 0 | 750 | 0 | 6130 | 5 |
| 19th 1000 at | 16 | 0 | 800 | 0 | 6930 | 5 |
| 20th 1000 at | 17 | 0 | 850 | 0 | 7780 | 5 |
| 21st 1000 at | 18 | 0 | 900 | 0 | 8680 | 5 |
| 22d 1000 at | 19 | 0 | 950 | 0 | 9630 | 5 |
| 23d 1000 at | 20 | 0 | 1000 | 0 | 10630 | 5 |
At the twenty-third thousand the tax becomes twenty shillings in the pound, and consequently every thousand beyond that sum can produce no profit but by dividing the estate. Yet formidable as this tax appears, it will not, I believe, produce so much as the commutation tax; should it produce more, it ought to be lowered to that amount upon estates under two or three thousand a year.
On small and middling estates it is lighter (as it is intended to be) than the commutation tax. It is not till after seven or eight thousand a year that it begins to be heavy. The object is not so much the produce of the tax, as the justice of the measure. The aristocracy has screened itself too much, and this serves to restore a part of the lost equilibrium.
As an instance of its screening itself, it is only necessary to look back to the first establishment of the excise laws, at what is called the Restoration, or the coming of Charles the Second. The aristocratical interest then in power, commuted the feudal services itself was under by laying a tax on beer brewed for sale; that is, they compounded with Charles for an exemption from those services for themselves and their heirs, by a tax to be paid by other people. The aristocracy do not purchase beer brewed for sale, but brew their own beer free of the duty, and if any commutation at that time were necessary, it ought to have been at the expense of those for whom the exemptions from those services were intended;25 instead of which it was thrown on an entire different class of men.
But the chief object of this progressive tax (besides the justice of rendering taxes more equal than they are) is, as already stated, to extirpate the overgrown influence arising from the unnatural law of primogeniture, and which is one of the principal sources of corruption at elections.
It would be attended with no good consequences to enquire how such vast estates as thirty, forty, or fifty thousand a year could commence, and that at a time when commerce and manufactures were not in a state to admit of such acquisitions. Let it be sufficient to remedy the evil by putting them in a condition of descending again to the community, by the quiet means of apportioning them among all the heirs and heiresses of those families. This will be the more necessary, because hitherto the aristocracy have quartered their younger children and connexions upon the public in useless posts, places, and offices,